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Abstract
Using a new dataset on household purchases of personal computers (PCs), we
document positive correlations between buyers' incomes and the prices they pay
for seemingly identical PCs. These results suggest that ¯rms may be successful
at separating the market and charging di®erent prices to consumers with di®erent
levels of willingness to pay. We consider the implications of this kind of market
separation for price and quality measurement via a theoretical model based on
Mussa and Rosen (1978). The model suggests that, in markets like these, stan-
dard methods that do not account for this heterogeneity can understate in°ation
in a cost-of-living context. Consistent with the model, our empirical work shows
that controlling for income yields indexes that show slower price declines than seen
in standard indexes. This understatement of the cost-of-living measure likely mit-
igates the unrelated upward biases found in recent studies by Bils (2009), Erickson
and Pakes (2010), Broda and Weinstein (2010).
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Prices for many goods tend to fall over the course of product cycles. Apparel, auto-
mobiles, and technological goods are examples of such products that are initially o®ered
at high introductory prices and are then subsequently discounted until they are no longer
available. There have been a host of explanations for such price declines including, but
not limited to, fashion-type e®ects, process innovation, and intertemporal price discrim-
ination. In this study, we analyze price declines for personal computers, a type of tech-
nology good.1 We attribute the price declines to consumer heterogeneity over willingness
to pay for quality and show that not accounting for this type of consumer heterogeneity
can understate in°ation growth in this sector.2
Technology goods are quite di®erent from many other goods which show price declines
over their product cycles. Unlike apparel, newly introduced technology goods are usually
of higher quality than the goods they replace. Thus, any taste for the fashion (or newness)
of a product may be tangled with the good's underlying better quality, as described by
Bils (2009). Furthermore, technological goods are rapidly introduced into the market
at staggered times. Accordingly, ¯rms introduce newer, high-quality computers while
still o®ering older, lower quality computers. This phenomenon does not occur in the
automobile industry where new models are introduced only once per year and vintage is
conspicuous.3
Our main ¯nding is that standard methods that do not take this type of consumer
heterogeneity into account can understate in°ation for personal computers. There are
few steps that we take to arrive at this result. First, using a new dataset on household
purchases of personal computers (PCs) from Metafacts Inc., we document positive corre-
lations between buyers' incomes and the prices they pay for identical PCs. High-income
buyers therefore pay higher prices for identical PCs than lower-income buyers, suggesting
1See Berndt, Griliches, and Rappaport (1995) and Nelson, Tanguay, and Patterson (1994) for price
measurement studies in this industry.
2This issue was ¯rst examined in Aizcorbe (2004) in a di®erent context, where consumer heterogeneity
of the type discussed here creates problems for the standard interpretation of price indexes as upper
bounds to a true cost of living index.
3Fashion-type e®ects have been explored empirically by Pashigian (1988) for apparel and Corrado,
Dunn, and Otoo (2006) for light vehicles.
1that ¯rms may be successful at separating the market and charging di®erent prices to
consumers with di®erent levels of willingness-to-pay for quality. Thus, the data imply
that richer households are not only buying more expensive, higher quality versions of
products, as discussed in Bils and Klenow (2001), but they are also paying a premium
for the relatively higher quality.
Second, we develop a dynamic theoretical model based on Mussa and Rosen (1978)
which shows that this kind of market separation can lead to the downward sloping pricing
patterns observed in the personal computer industry. The model includes two types of
consumer heterogeneity: (1) heterogeneity over price elasticity and (2) heterogeneity over
taste for newness. Thus, our model allows for two classes of consumer preferences; one
is more general and the other is a more speci¯c fashion-type e®ect. Firms can exploit
both of these types of heterogeneity by selling higher quality products at a high markup
to those willing to pay top dollar and selling lower quality products to those with lower
willingness to pay. We then show conditions where such static price discrimination can
exist in a dynamic equilibrium. This type of static separating equlibrium has been
studied extensively in the industrial organization literature but, to our knowledge, has
never been linked with dynamic pricing patterns in technological goods.4 We believe that
the assumptions needed for this type of market separation are plausible in a technology
goods industry where newer high quality goods are sold contemporaneously with lower
quality products that have been on the market for some time.
Third, we use the theoretical model to assess the implications of such consumer
heterogeneity for the standard price indexes typically used to measure in°ation. The
model predicts that a \matched-model" price measure|which controls for quality by
measuring the price change of the same computer over two-periods|will understate the
true change in cost-of-loving when the price decline of that computer model is due to
the ¯rm separating the market between consumer types. The intuition for this result is
that the matched-model price decline is not relevant to any single consumer type since
the market is always separated in equilibrium. Consumers with high-willingness-to-pay
4These models of static price discrimination over vertically di®erentiated goods were developed by
Mussa and Rosen (1978), Mirman and Sibley (1980), and Maskin and Riley (1984). Gowrisankaran and
Rysman (2009) and Nair (2007) analyze a market where the distribution of consumers is changing over
time such that ¯rms are intertemporally price discriminating in dynamic equilibrium.
2will always be enticed to buy the highest quality good available and consumers with low
willingness to pay will always go for the cheaper option. Thus, the model posits that
there is no gain in consumer surplus from a price decline of a single computer model as
long as a better computer arrives the following period.
Finally, we consider several methods that an econometrician could use to assess how
sensitive price indexes are to handling this e®ect due to consumer heterogeneity. Apply-
ing methods developed by Pakes (2003) to our household-level survey data, we compare
hedonic price indexes that do not control for this heterogeneity with those that do by
including income in the hedonic regression. Our results from the survey data show that
the hedonic index that controls for income falls at about one tenth slower than a stan-
dard hedonic index. Furthermore, our results with the scanner data show that when
we include the age of the PC in the hedonic price measure|a variable that we show is
potentially correlated with consumer attributes| prices are rising over the sample pe-
riod. Overall, the fact that these alternative segment-speci¯c price indexes show °atter
price declines is consistent with the theoretical prediction of the model. Speci¯cally, our
empirical result con¯rms that at least a portion of the price fall for a given computer
model is due to consumer heterogeneity in taste which, we argue, ultimately should be
held ¯xed in cost-of-living indexes.
It is important to note that our results contrast to those found in a few recent studies.
Erickson and Pakes (2009) show that selection bias by exiting models will result in an
overstatement of in°ation in the matched-model index. Bils (2009) ¯nds that forced
substitutions by the BLS may be attributing too much growth to prices as opposed to
quality, and Broda and Weinstein (2009) ¯nd that creation and destruction of products
can hide quality upgrades that are not captured by indexes based on a ¯xed basket
of goods. Our study is not refuting these results in any fashion, but rather illustrates
an additional bias which should be taken into account when constructing cost-of-living
measures.5
The study is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the data. In Section
5There have studies other than ours that highlight a downward bias in BLS practices. Hobijn (2002)
shows that in°ation can be understated or overstated depending on the costs per quality unit between
high and low cost products. Silver and Heravi (2005) show that in°ation will be understated in the case
of a matched-model index with sample degradation.
33, we review the model, both in the homogeneous one-product case, as well as the
heterogeneous consumer two-product case. In Section 4, we show that the model is able
to generate downward-sloping price contours where consumers with high willingness to
pay pay a premium and purchase early in the product's life-cycle. In Section 5, we draw
on the model's implications for price measurement. Here we show that the matched-
model price measure matches the model's prediction of price in°ation in the case of a
homogeneous consumer but does not match the model's prediction in the heterogeneous
case. In Section 6, we generate price indexes that control for consumer heterogeneity and
demonstrate that prices are falling at a slower rate than the standard matched-model or
hedonic price measures imply. In Section 7 we conclude.
2 Data
Our study uses data from two sources: a household survey data from the \Tech-
nology User Pro¯le" (TUP) administered by MetaFacts and scanner data compiled by
NPD Techworld. In the TUP data, we have access to four annual surveys that were
conducted in 2001 through 2004. TUP is a detailed two-stage survey of Americans' use
of information technology and consumer electronics products and services at home and
in the workplace. The ¯rst stage is a screener, which asks for the characteristics of each
head of household (such as income, education level, marital status, and presence of chil-
dren). The second stage consists of the technology survey, which asks a multitude of
questions ranging from brand, to year of purchase, to where the computer is used.6 An
observation in this data consists of household demographics and computer speci¯cations
including the price paid. We drop observations where we believe measurement error is
present.7 MetaFacts generates computer weights, which can be inferred as quantities on
6Although, the survey does include information on second and third computers owned by the house-
hold this study focuses on what the household reports as their \primary" computer.
7Speci¯cally, we drop observations where the price paid is reported less than $100 and where the PC
is younger than three years old at the time of the survey. We also isolate observations where the PC is
used at home.
4the household-computer type level.8
The NPD data are point-of-sale9 scanner data sent to NPD Techworld via automatic
feeds from their participating outlets on a weekly basis.10 The data cover nine quarters,
2002:Q1 to 2004:Q3 and consist of sales occurring at outlet stores, thus manufacturers
such as Dell that sell directly to the consumer are not included. Each observation consists
of a model identi¯cation number, speci¯cations for that model, the total units sold, and
revenue. From units sold and revenue we calculate a unit price of each PC sold.11 Figure
1 shows an example of prices for di®erent models of 15-inch Hewlett Packard laptop
computers over the sample period. This downward sloping pattern of pricing dynamics
over the model's life cycle is ubiquitous across a range of brands and types of personal
computers as can be seen in Table 1, which shows the average monthly price declines for
the manufacturers in the NPD sample.
2.1 Demographics and Price
The pricing dynamics of personal computers seen in Figure 1 has potentially inter-
esting implications for identifying demographic patterns in the data. Speci¯cally, since
there is variation in both the price and consumer types for a particular computer model,
we can identify which types of consumers are purchasing at di®erent points of the com-
puter's time on the market. We analyze this variation in consumer types running the
following ¯xed-e®ect regression in the TUP dataset:
8MetaFacts uses a two-stage algorithm in which they ¯rst create household weights from the U.S.
Census data which are subsequently linked with computer data in the survey to create weights on the
computer-household level.
9\Point-of-sale" means that any rebates or other discounts (coupons, for example) that occur at the
cash register are included in the price reported; \mail in rebates" and other discounts that occur after
the sale are not.
10The weekly data are organized into monthly data using the \Atkins Month De¯nition," where the
¯rst, second and third weeks of the quarter include four, four and ¯ve weeks, respectively.
11We remove observations where the PC was reported as \refurbished." We also remove observations
where geographically isolated sales are likely to induce measurement error in our unit price variable.
Speci¯cally, we drop observations with less than 50 units sold in a month and less than 1000 units in
the model's entire lifespan.
5lnPij = ® + ¯Zi + ºj + "i;j (1)
where Zi represents a vector of demographic and location variables of consumer i while
ºj represents a ¯xed e®ect of computer model. Speci¯cally, À is a dummy variable repre-
senting year-RAM-speed-harddrive-form-manufacturer, where form represents whether
the PC is a laptop or desktop of PC model j. As the TUP survey does not indicate the
size of the monitor purchased, we limit our sample to desktop computers purchased with
no monitor. Our results did not change using the entire sample. Since we are controlling
for the type of computer j, a signi¯cant estimate of the coe±cients on the demographic
variables, ¯, indicates that consumers with di®erent demographics paid di®erent prices
for the same computer. Given that the NPD scanner data indicates that most of the
variation in price is declining from the good's introduction, in this study we assume that
a positive coe±cient on a demographic variable indicates that consumers of that type
purchased earlier in the computer's life cycle.
Table 2 displays the results of a regression where we include income as a parametric
variable (that is, lnIncome). We run a second regression where we include demographic
variables other than income. In both speci¯cations, income is positively and signi¯cantly
correlated with price holding ¯xed the characteristics of the computer.12 Speci¯cally, the
coe±cient on lnIncome is approximately 0.09 and signi¯cant at the 3-percent level. This
indicates that a ten percent fall in income would result in .9 percent lower price paid for
any given computer.
3 Model
Our goal in this section is to formulate a model that can disentangle the distinct
causes for the price declines seen in Figure 1, and simultaneously match the features
12For robustness purposes, we ran the same regression but included dummy variables indicating the
income bin, instead of the logarithm of income. We also ran a pooled regression in which we included
extra product characteristics which are subsequently included in the index analysis in the ¯nal section
of the paper. The results do not change signi¯cantly for any of these regressions. We chose to display
the ¯xed-e®ects regression for lnIncome for ease and clarity of composition.
6of the data described in the preceding section|that higher income consumers purchase
computers at higher price levels, presumably earlier in the computer's product life cy-
cle. We describe a dynamic model that generates a stationary equilibrium such that a
separating equilibrium occurs between consumers with di®erent tastes for quality. The
model generates parameters that govern the degree of consumer heterogeneity in taste
for quality as well as parameters that govern the amount of price in°ation and product
quality growth. These parameters will later be used to generate an algebraic represen-
tation for a representative price contour that will be useful in decomposing price growth
between consumer-speci¯c, quality-speci¯c, and in°ation-speci¯c factors.
We describe the model in a two-step fashion. First, we analyze the model under a
setting of a representative consumer with a single-quality product ¯rm. The represen-
tative consumer must decide between purchasing the product in the present period or
waiting to purchase the following period when a higher quality product is introduced.
The monopolist faces su±ciently low costs of adoption such that adoption occurs ever
period. In equilibrium, the representative consumer purchases the product in the same
period she enters the market.
In the second step, we extend the model by allowing for heterogeneity in consumer
consumer taste. We describe the necessary and su±cient conditions of the parameters
where the monopolist ¯nds it optimal to separate the market between consumers of dif-
fering consumer tastes. The assumption of a monopoly is strong, but allows for tractable
parameters of consumer preferences which facilitates our analysis in Section 5. Copeland
and Shapiro (2010) analyze the single-product ¯rm's pricing decision in an oligopolistic
market. Interestingly, the end product of the single-product oligopolist and the multi-
product monopolist who adopts every period (discussed in this study) is the same from
the vantage point of the consumer. In both cases, consumers with di®ering tastes for
quality are separated in equilibrium. That is, consumers with higher willingness to pay
choose the high-quality product and pay a large markup while consumers with low will-
ingness to pay choose the low-quality product and pay a low markup. Thus, our result
of market seperation is not necessarily dependent on market structure.
73.1 Representative Consumer and Single-Quality Product Firm
We ¯rst look at the simple case of a representative consumer and a single-quality
good ¯rm. We solve for the dynamic demand function of the representative consumer in
the setting where she takes as given that a new product of a di®erent quality is o®ered
in the subsequent period and that she can hold on to the good for an in¯nite period
of time. One representative consumer enters the market each period, and we therefore
abstract from the consumer's decision to upgrade her computer. We then describe the
dynamic price path o®ered by the ¯rm in equilibrium and show that this price path
grows proportionally with the underlying exogenous growth rate of quality.
3.1.1 Demand
The representative consumer makes a discrete choice of whether to purchase a com-
puter o®ered of quality xt. As is standard in the industrial organization literature, we
assume that the consumer's direct utility for the product is quasilinear with respect to the




d ¤ f(xt) + ~ µtct (2)
subject to:
yt = ct + p(xt)
where d is the consumer's choice of whether to purchase, p(xt) represents the price of
a good with quality xt,13 f(xt) represents the total discounted utility of holding onto
the good into the future,14, yt is income, and ~ µt is the marginal rate of substitution
between income and utility. The parameter ~ µt is simply the relative utility received from
holding the numeraire commodity as opposed to holding onto the product in period t.
For example, if ~ µt falls in value from period t to period t + 1, then the value of the
numeraire commodity falls relative to the good, and price in°ation will ensue. As this is






1¡¯ where º(xt) is the per period service °ow from using the computer and
¯ is the discount factor.
8a time-varying parameter, one can think of this as a monetary shock where the value of
the numeraire commodity °uctuates relative to the good. In Section 5, we will describe
how ~ µt ¯ts into a welfare-based cost-of-living measure.
Substituting the budget constraint into the utility function we arrive at the standard
indirect utility maximization problem of the consumer:
max
d2f0;1g
d ¤ (f(xt) ¡ ~ µtp(xt)) + ~ µtyt (3)
As the outside good is the numeraire commodity, the consumer will purchase the good
(that is, d = 1) if p(xt) · µtf(xt) where µt is the inverse of the time varying aggregate
marginal rate of substitution ~ µt (that is, µ = (1=~ µ)).
We consider the representative consumer's two-period choice decision where a new
representative consumer shows up to the retailer each period and subsequently faces the
same two-period dynamic consumption decision. The consumer will decide to purchase a
good in the current period t, or wait until next period t+1, when the ¯rm o®ers a good
with quality xt+1. We assume that quality grows at constant rate ¾¤, which is known
to the consumer and the ¯rm, but that ~ µt follows the process E[~ µt+1j¡t] = ~ µt where ¡t
represents the consumer's information set at time t. Her consumption decision can be
represented as:
maxff(xt) ¡ ~ µtp(xt); ¯E[(f(xt+1) ¡ ~ µt+1p(xt+1))j¡t]g: (4)
With ¯ > 0, the consumer weighs the option of foregoing her purchase in period t in
order to purchase a potentially higher quality product in period t + 1. Therefore, after
taking expectations, a consumer deciding between period t and period t+1 will purchase
in period t if:
p(xt) · µtf(xt) ¡ ¯(µtf(xt+1) ¡ E[p(xt+1)j¡t]): (5)
Because growth in quality is ¯xed at
xt+1
xt = ¾¤, the consumer's valuation, f(xt) must
grow at a rate that is a function of this exogenous technological growth. Thus, the
consumer assumes that f(xt) grows at rate
_ f
f = ¾f and assumes that p(xt) grows at an
9expected rate of
_ p




1 if p(xt) · ±µtf(xt)






The ¯rm is a forward-looking monopolist who takes the growth in (upstream) quality
as exogenous and faces zero adoption costs. It sets a price each period of product quality
xt given the consumer's dynamic demand function, equation (6). That is, the ¯rm
maximizes its pro¯ts p(xt) ¡ C(xt), where C(xt) is the cost of supplying good xt. Thus,
we abstract from the ¯rm's dynamic adoption decision and assume that marginal and
adoption costs are su±ciently low that the ¯rm will choose to adopt a new product every
period.
The ¯rm's pro¯t maximization problem in the static setting is quite trivial. It charges
the highest price it can and reaps all of the consumer surplus of the representative
consumer each period by setting p(xt) = µtf(xt). In the dynamic setting, however, the
¯rm must set a path of future prices such that the market clears each period. It turns out
the equilibrium path of prices is such that prices grow proportionally with the growth
rate of utility. This result is provided in the following theorem:
Theorem 1. The equilibrium price path is ¾p = ¾f such that ± = 1.
Proof. See Appendix
Theorem 1 tells us that in equilibrium, prices will grow at the same rate as the
growth in utility, ¾f. It follows that the ¯rm sets ± = 1 and markets clear each period
at the price p(xt) = µtf(xt). As it is always optimal for the ¯rm to set prices that grow
with the consumer's valuation of the good|which is dependent on the good's quality|
15That is, f(xt+1) = (1 + ¾f)f(xt) and E[p(xt+1)j¡t] = (1 + E[¾pj¡t])p(xt).
10waiting until the next period to purchase the better-quality good will yield zero consumer
surplus regardless of the representative consumer's discount factor. Thus, in equilibrium,
the representative consumer who enters the market in period t purchases the product in
in the same period.
3.2 Heterogeneous Consumers and Multi-Quality Product Firm
We extend the model by adding heterogeneity in consumer valuations over quality,
as well as adding heterogeneity in quality of the underlying product. Since ~ µt is common
to all consumers, and consumers perceive that E[~ µt+1j¡t] = ~ µt, we can normalize ~ µt = 1
without any loss in generality.16 Heterogeneity in quality is described via the parameter
r, which identi¯es the \rank" of the quality of the good relative to other goods at time
period t. It follows that for any two goods, xj;t > xk;t if j < k. An important assumption
we make in order to keep the model tractable is that the number of goods entering each
period is equal to the number of goods exiting. This assumption implies that, each
period, two di®erent goods are o®ered, one with rank 1 and one with rank 2. It follows
that any good with rank r grows in quality at rate ¾¤ between periods t and t + 1.
There exist two types of consumers, i 2 fH;Lg, where a proportion ® of consumers
are H-type consumers and the remaining proportion, 1¡®, are L-type consumers. Con-





i;rf(xr;t) ¡ p(xr;t)) + y
i
t (7)
where b represents a consumer-speci¯c valuation attached to the discounted service °ow
such that bi;rf(xr;t) is the value that a consumer of type i places on good with quality
xr;t.17 In order to keep the model open to di®ering types of taste distributions, we ana-
lyze two cases of heterogeneity over consumer tastes:
16The importance of movements ~ µt will become apparent in Section 5.
17As shown in Tirole (1988), one can reinterpret this preference parameter as the inverse of the




11² Case 1: Heterogeneity in Price Elasticity: bH > bL for any r
² Case 2: Heterogeneity in Taste for Rank (or Newness): bH;1 > bL;1 and bH;2 < bL;2
Case 1 is the scenario where the H-type consumer is less price elastic than the L-type
consumer and therefore has a higher willingness to pay for any given quality. Case 2
is the scenario where the H-type consumer places a strong aversion towards relatively
low-quality goods. For instance, case 2 would be a situation in which H-types are gamers
and need the latest technology products to keep pace with the latest software. It could
also be a situation where H-type consumers have a high cost for searching for information
about products (that is, they simply ask the retailer for the highest quality product when
they walk through the door).
3.2.1 The Static Case
The ¯rm's problem in the two-consumer-type static case is to maximize pro¯ts given
consumer utility bi;rf(xr;t)¡p(xr;t)+yi
t if di = 1. This is analogous to the static case of the
representative consumer, however now the ¯rm has the option to separate the market by
o®ering di®erent quality products in order to increase its pro¯ts. We look at the speci¯c
case where the ¯rm can choose to o®er the good in two di®erent qualities, where good
1 represents the high-quality good and good 2 represents the low-quality good in any
period t. Thus, we are splitting xt of the preceding section into a two-dimensional vector
of high- and low-quality goods fx1;t;x2;tg. For the separating equilibrium to occur, the
¯rm must be able to separate the market and also ¯nd it pro¯t-maximizing to do so.
Such prices are delineated by Mussa and Rosen (1978):
² Case 1: The ¯rm's prices must satisfy: p(x1;t) = bHf(x1;t) ¡ (bH ¡ bL)f(x2;t) and
p(x2;t) = bLf(x2;t).
² Case 2: The ¯rm's prices must satisfy: p(x1;t) = bH;1f(x1;t) and p(x2;t) = bL;2f(x2;t).
Under case 2, the ¯rm will separate the market by o®ering each consumer his reserva-
tion price: p(xr;t) = bi;rf(xr;t). Under case 1, however, the H-type values the rank-2 good
12more than the L-type consumer, and the ¯rm must lower the price of the rank-1 good
to dissuade the H-type from deviating and purchasing the rank-2 good. Speci¯cally, the
bound is lowered by the extra utility the H-type would have received over the L-type of
consuming the rank-2 good, (bH ¡bL)f(x2;t). This lowering of the price ensures that the
H-type consumer does not purchase the rank-2 good instead of the rank-1 good (that is,
that ensure the equilibrium is incentive compatible). In either case, the ¯rm will ¯nd it
pro¯t-maximizing to separate the market as long as ® is su±ciently small|that is, the
number of L-types is su±ciently large (see Tirole (1988)).
3.2.2 Stationary Equilibrium in a Dynamic Setting
The consumers' dynamic problem in the multi-quality product case is similar to the
consumer's problem in the single-quality case, however, there is now the added option
of purchasing a di®erent rank good in the following period. Thus, for markets to clear
each period, we must ¯nd conditions for which it is not optimal for the consumer to wait
until the following period to purchase a di®erent rank good.
It can be trivially shown that it is never optimal for the L-type consumer to wait to
purchase the rank-1 good in the following period in either case 1 or case 2. It is also
never optimal for the H-type to wait to purchase the rank-2 good in case 2.18 In case
1, however, this decision is dependent on the size of the discount factor. Speci¯cally,
it is not optimal to wait to purchase the rank-2 good only if the discount factor, ¯ lies
below 1
1+¾f (that is, ¯ < 1
1+¾f).19 Thus, if the H-type is su±ciently impatient, she will
choose not to wait to purchase the rank-2 good in the subsequent period. In the setting
where the consumer is choosing only between the same rank good in the current and
subsequent periods, the demand decision is analogous to the representative consumer,
one-quality good model:
maxfb
i;rf(xt) ¡ p(xt); ¯E[(b
i;rf(xt+1) ¡ p(xt+1))j¡t]g (8)
18In this case, the ¯rm prices at p(x1;t) = bH;1f(x1;t) and p(x2;t) = bL;2µtf(x2;t). It holds that
bH;2f(x2;t+1) < p(x2;t+1) and it is never optimal for the H-type to wait.
19This is equivalent to the condition ¾f <
1¡¯
¯ described in the proof of Theorem 1. This restriction
is found by setting bHf(x1;t) ¡ p(x1;t) > ¯bHf(x2;t+1) ¡ p(x2;t+1) under the conditions that p(x1;t) =
bHf(x1;t) ¡ (bH ¡ bL)f(x2;t), f(x2;t+1) = (1 + ¾f)f(x2;t), and p(x2;t+1) = bLf(x2;t+1).
13where bi;r represents the consumer-speci¯c utility for consuming a product with quality




1 if p(xr;t) · ±bi;rf(xr;t)
0 if p(xr;t) > ±bi;rf(xr;t)
(9)
Each period, the ¯rm separates the market between L-type and H-type consumers
and a separating equilibrium ensues. It can be shown that Theorem 1 holds and the
¯rm's optimal price path is analogous to the case of the representative consumer.
When the ¯rm is able to separate the market it will o®er two goods each period and
charge a premium on rank-1 goods sold to H-type consumers. The larger the degree
of consumer heterogeneity, the more the ¯rm can charge to the H-type relative to the
low-type consumer
p(x1;t)¡p(x2;t)
p(x2;t) , and the higher the premium, ¢, the ¯rm can charge
on the highest quality good. Substituting the market-clearing prices into this de¯nition
of the premium, we can represent it as a function of the underlying taste and quality
parameters:






² Case 2: ¢ =
bH;1f(x1;t)
bL;2f(x2;t) ¡ 1
Thus, the premium will increase with bH
bL and
f(x1;t)
f(x2;t) and will be independent of time as
long as the b's are constant.
4 Generating Price Contours
We now show that the model generates price contours that resemble those seen in both
the NPD data and TUP data. That is, we show that the model is able generate downward
sloping price contours where H-types (that is, high income consumers) purchase newly
introduced rank-1 goods and low-types (that is, low-income consumers) purchase rank-2
goods.
We introduce a new variable indicating a computer model, where computer model j
lives for two periods, and with introduction of a new, higher quality model every period,
14a given model will fall in rank, from rank-1 to rank-2, between the ¯rst and second
periods. In the third period, we assume the model exits the market place. Thus, the
former highest quality product (that is, rank-1), becomes the second highest quality good
(that is, rank-2) in the subsequent period but the model number does not change over
periods. We label the price path generated over time of any given computer model a
\price contour," which is analogous to the price contours of computer models observed
in the data.20
Sequential models are labeled alphabetically, such that model b replaces model a as
the rank-1 good in period t, and subsequently in period t + 1, model c replaces model b
as the rank-1 good. Since prices of the entire °eet of goods grows at rate ¾f, it follows
that p(xb
1;t+1) = (1 + ¾f)p(xa
1;t), and we can show the price contour as the relationship
between prices in any period for a given computer model:
p(x
b











which indicates that in the case of two di®erent quality goods o®ered each period, price
contours will be downward sloping if ¢ > ¾f, °at if ¢ = ¾f, and upward sloping if
¢ < ¾f. Substituting the de¯nition of ¢ into (10), and using the fact that the ¯rm
that adopts the new model will choose a model at the technological frontier (that is,
f(x1;t)
f(x2;t) = ¾f + 1) it follows that the price contour will always be downward sloping if
bH > bL. Figure 2 depicts the price contours generated under the model when µ is ¯xed
to equal 1. The upper dotted line indicates the ¯xed growth path of prices for the rank-1
good, and the lower dotted line for the rank-2 good. Both price paths are increasing due
to positive quality growth, and thus each of these paths is growing at rate 1 + ¾f. The
¯gure demonstrates that a larger premium will widen the distance between the two price
paths and therefore push the price of the rank-2 good down relative to the rank-1 good
between time periods. The larger is the premium, the larger the price fall of a given
computer model must be in order to compensate the premium within the two growth














15paths. Thus, the model posits that the price for any given computer model is being
driven down from period t to period t + 1 due to a drop in the premium charged to the
H-type consumer over the L-type consumer.
This idea can be more easily intuited under case 2 and representing the ratio bH;1
bL;2 as:
° + 1 =
bH;1
bL;2; (11)
which allows us to represent the premium as
¢ = (° + 1)(¾
f + 1) ¡ 1
= ° + ¾
f + ¾
f°: (12)
This relationship above shows that a signi¯cant portion of the premium between rank-1
and rank-2 goods is owed to heterogeneity in taste for quality. To relate this idea with
the patterns seen in the data, we depict equation (12) in Figure 3 which shows the pricing
dynamics of two models (a and b) over the course of three time periods, (t ¡ 1, t, and
t + 1). The ¯gure shows the premium decomposed between °, the portion due solely
to the ¯rm exploiting bH;1 > bL;2 by separating the market, and ¾f + ¾f°, the portion
of the premium due to utility growth stemming from growth in the underlying quality
of the distribution, ¾¤. The ¯gure demonstrates that the sole source of the price fall of
good a is due to ° > 0. When heterogeneity of relative value over rank diminishes, (that
is, when bH;1 = bL;2) such that ° = 0, price contours become °at. As long as ° > 0,
price contours will be downward sloping due to the fact that ¯rms charge a high price
on rank-1 goods in order to capture their consumer surplus.21
An important thing to note here is that the downward sloping nature of the price
contours has nothing to do with the durability of the good. That is, the model does not
posit that the distribution of consumers is changing over the life of the product whereby
high-willingness-to-pay consumers drop out of the market after purchasing early in the
21Since the downward price fall is owed to ° > 0, the model shows downward sloping price contours
is not related to the good changing in physical quality between periods. This can be seen by looking at






2;t) = 1 + ¾f, which means that for f(xb
1;t) = (1 + ¾f)f(xa
2;t) = f(xb
2;t+1).
16product cycle.22 Rather, prices are falling due to two conditions: (1) ¯rms are price
discriminating in the static sense, and (2) higher-quality goods are being o®ered in the
subsequent period. Thus, the combination of market separation and technology growth
is essential to this outcome of intertemporal price declines.
5 Implications for Price Measurement
Having set up the model and showing its link with the data we are now in a position
to analyze the implications of market separation on price-change measures. First, we
show that price changes, or \price relatives," are a component of most cost-of-living
indexes. Speci¯cally, cost-of-living indexes can be represented by a weighted sum of price
relatives between any two price regimes. A matched-model index is simply a weighted
sum of price relatives between individual model numbers. We then show that the extent
to which the matched-model measure di®ers from actual in°ation (that is, movement in
µt) will depend on some key parameters of the model described above. In particular, if
the two measures of in°ation are to overlap, one must control for the component of the
premium due to market separation. Finally, we show that one method of controlling for
discrepancy is through hedonic techniques.
5.1 Cost-of-Living Indexes
5.1.1 Matched-Model Cost-of-Living Index
A cost-of-living index tracks the compensation needed to keep a speci¯c consumer's
utility ¯xed when transferring to a new price regime. The consumer's utility is subse-
quently based on the consumer's preference ordering of goods. Let Ri denote the pref-
erence ordering of consumer type i between consumption bundles Q and Q0, such that
Q R Q0 if and only if Ui(Q) ¸ Ui(Q0), where Ui(¢) is the direct utility function (see Pol-
lak (1989)). Thus, consumer i's particular direct utility function, Ui(¢), depends on how
she orders goods according to her individual preference, Ri. Consumer i's compensated
22See Stokey (1979), Conlisk, Gerstner, and Sobel (1984), and Nair (2007) for an examination of this
type of \intertemporal price discrimination."
17demand function (that is, Hicksian demand correspondence), Hi(P;sjUi), gives the level
of demand that would arise if she were compensated for any change in price, p, to keep
her utility ¯xed at level s. Finally, we let W(P;sjUi) represent the minimum expenditure
required to attain a particular utility level, s, such that W(P;sjUi) = P ¢ H(P;sjUi).
A cost-of-living index captures the change in the minimum expenditure needed to
keep consumer i's utility level ¯xed at level s if the price vector is varied. Speci¯cally, it
is the ratio of the minimum expenditures, W, under two di®erent aggregate price states,






~ P ¢ H( ~ P;sjUi)
P ¢ H(P;sjUi)
; (13)
where the denominator represents the \reference" period and the numerator the \com-
parison" period. This representation of the cost-of-living index highlights the fact that
in comparing the minimum expenditure required to obtain utility s, we must hold ¯xed
consumer i's particular direct utility function. Thus, the index is designed to compare
the minimum expenditures of a particular type of consumer with preference ordering Ri.
Under the simpli¯ed scenario of a representative consumer, whose preferences are
¯xed, in a market with no entering or exiting goods, a Laspeyres price index can be
calculated as an approximation to I(P; ~ P;s;Ui) where the quantities purchased in the
reference period are used as a substitute for the Hicksian demand:
I
L(P; ~ P) =











where qj represents the quantity of good j, !j is the expenditure share of good j in
the reference period, and
~ pj
pj is the \price relative" between di®erent price regimes for
good j.23 The Laspeyres index represents an upper bound on I(P; ~ P;s;Ui) because it
does not take into account the fact that the consumer can substitute to cheaper goods
when one moves to the comparison price regime. Thus, the Laspeyres assumes that the
representative consumer's utility level, s, is held ¯xed by keeping the quantities of goods
¯xed.
23The Paasche index is analogous to 14 except the quantities in the comparison period are held ¯xed.
18In the context of creating a cost-of-living index for goods whose quality is distin-
guished by its model number, (14) can be interpreted as a matched-model price index.
Speci¯cally, model numbers are di®erentiated by j and the base and reference periods
represent two di®erent time periods. Thus, a Laspeyres matched-model price index is a
weighted sum of price relatives and represents an upper bound on the amount of dollars
needed to keep utility ¯xed when prices of existing models change between periods t and
t + 1.
5.1.2 The Hedonic Cost-of-Living Index
Hedonic price indexes are primarily used in cases when a speci¯c good exits or enters
the market and a comparison or reference period price cannot be calculated under spec-
i¯cation (14). In such a scenario, Pakes (2003) shows that an expectation of the price of
the good, conditional on its observable characteristics, can be included as a substitute
for the missing observable price. This expectation of the price is based on the hedonic
function. Speci¯cally, for good j with observable characteristics xj the hedonic function





The hedonic function is the predicted value of the price of good j conditional on its vec-
tor of characteristics, xj. Thus, the hedonic assumes that the representative consumer's
preference ordering of goods, R, can be decomposed into the characteristics of the un-
derlying good, xj. This procedure theoretically allows the prices of exiting goods to be
compared to their expected prices in the subsequent period; similarly entering goods can
be compared to their expected price in the previous period.
Letting Ct represent the choice set available in period t, we can create a hedonic
function, ht(x), for each time period in the sample. A Laspeyeres index (or any other



















19where ht(¢) is the tth period predicted value of the hedonic regression, !j is the expen-







, and Ct represents the basket of goods available in
period t.
Under certain conditions, the hedonic price relative will overlap with that of the
matched-model. This can be see in Figure 4, where we convert the depiction of price
versus time into a relationship between price and quality of the good. In this particular
example, the hedonic is perfectly identi¯ed by the good's model number, the fall in the









5.2 Price Measures in the Context of the Model
We now show that the model delineated in Section 3 allows us to calculate the
compensating variation between any two price regimes. Thus, we can can compute
the amount of dollars needed to keep a given consumer's utility ¯xed between any two
price regimes and then compare the matched-model and hedonic price measures to the
measure of in°ation generated from the model. We show that the the degree of consumer
heterogeneity plays a large role in how our model and the matched-model price measures
di®er.
5.2.1 Homogenous Consumers
We start with the representation of the matched-model in the homogenous consumer
case where the ¯rm sets a price p(xt) = µtf(xt). The bene¯t of the model is that we can
di®erentiate between aggregate movements in µt and growth in quality xt. This lets us see
hypothetical scenarios of what prices would look like under di®erent price regimes. The
linkage between the parameter µ and the cost-of-living index described above becomes
apparent by reviewing the consumer's direct utility function, equation (2). The intuition
is most straightforward in the case when the consumer is only consuming the numeraire
commodity. It follows that if ~ µ falls from value, say ~ µt = 1 to ~ µt+1 = 0:25, the consumer
needs
~ µt
~ µt+1 = 4 times the amount of the numeraire commodity for his utility to be kept
¯xed. Thus, movements in ~ µ capture the amount of expenditure needed to keep the
20consumer's direct utility ¯xed between di®erent aggregate regimes|just as the cost-of-
living index is intended to do.
The same intuition follows in the case when the consumer decides to purchase the
product (i.e., d = 1.). In this case, movements in ~ µ induce movements in the price
charged to the consumer by the ¯rm. With some added notation, it follows from the
model that under the regime µa (where µa = 1=~ µa), the ¯rm will set a price:
pa(xt) = µaf(xt): (17)
Thus, the ¯rm will price a good of quality xt at pt+1(xt) = µt+1f(xt) under regime
µt+1 and will price a good of quality xt+1 at pt(xt+1) = µtf(xt+1) under regime µt. As
in Aizcorbe (2005), we can decompose total price growth (TPG) between that due to













In the simple case where f(x) = x, it follows that TPG = [1+¾¤][
µt+1
µt ].24 If we want
the cost-of-living index to measure the amount of the numeraire commodity (e.g. dollars)
needed to keep the consumer's utility ¯xed between aggregate price regime changes,
then the matched-model index needs to be a good measure of
µt+1
µt . With homogenous
















which means MM =
µt+1
µt , and the matched model is picking up exactly what it is supposed
to|\in°ation" as measured by a change in price regimes. Likewise quality growth would
be measured as the de°ated portion of (18) using our matched-model measure of in°ation,
which results in 1 + ¾¤ = 1 + ¾f which again is accurate since we assumed in this case
that f(x) = x.
24If we wish to allow for curvature of the utility f(¢) such that f(x) = xc for some constant jcj < 1 it




We now show that the matched-model price relative performs poorly in the case
of heterogeneous consumers. Our hypothetical prices found in the heterogeneous case
can thus be varied in the same way as in the homogenous case. For example, in case
2, pt+1(x1;t) = µt+1bH;1f(x1;t) is the price charged for good x1;t under regime µt+1 and
pt(x1;t+1) = µtbH;1f(x1;t+1) is the price charged for good x1;t under regime µt. Decompos-

























Plugging in the parameters from the model results in:

















The above relationship shows that the matched-model price relative is mis-measuring
\in°ation,"
µt+1
µt , due to the fact that consumers have di®ering tastes, (that is, bH > bL).25
Speci¯cally, the matched-model price measure is formulated under the hypothesis that
an H-type consumer would switch her preference from a rank-1 good to a rank-2 good
whereas the model is constructed under the separating equilibrium where this does not
occur. In other words, the model is constructed such that, not only does the H-type
consumer not wish to wait to purchase the same computer in the subsequent period, but
even if she did wait, given her subsequent choice of products and prices she would be
enticed to purchase the higher quality good. Thus, the relevant price changes for this
type of consumer are those prices of computers with the highest quality.
Overall, the extent to which the matched-model measure of price in°ation falls below
the actual price in°ation implied by the model will be a function of the degree of consumer
heterogeneity in taste. A larger degree of heterogeneity will imply a larger markup
charged to the H-type consumer, a larger markup drop in the subsequent period, and
therefore a larger price fall measured by the matched-model index.





[1 + ¾µ], where 1
1+° = 1+¾
1+¢, which
is the same condition as (10).
225.3 A Segment-Hedonic Cost-of-Living Index
The relationship in (20) reveals if the econometrician is trying to match the price
measure implied by the model, she would ideally like to control for the premium gen-
erated by consumer heterogeneity in calculating the price relatives. A measure of price
movements that control for the speci¯c type of consumer could be constructed by looking
at the price paid by a speci¯c type of individual|either H-type or L-type. For instance,
one could generate price relatives based on comparing the price of the same PC model j


















With a hedonic regression one would want to impute the price that the H-type will
pay for a given computer model and a given choice set (that is, if it were a rank-1 good),
but she happened to live in period t + 1 instead of period t, which corresponds to the
numerator of equation (21), ht+1(x
j
1;t). Thus, this price change measure is capturing the
experiment of dropping an individual o® on one island with regime µt and then dropping
her o® on another island with regime µt+1 and then comparing the amount of dollars
needed to keep her equally happy on both islands, given that the exact same computers
were available on both. An index of this sort would be a segment-hedonic price measure
since the hedonic measure would control for the characteristics of the consumer and
hence the markup charged to this type of individual.26
With enough consumer speci¯c price data, one can directly compute the imputed
price ht+1(x
j
1;t) above by isolating consumers into speci¯c consumer type bins, i. This
exercise requires obtaining a well de¯ned consumer attribute variable which distinguishes
between \consumer types," as well as a large enough data set such that one could ¯nd
at least two individuals of the same consumer type, i, purchasing the same product
between any two periods. When the size of the data is limited, however, one could





P i¢H(P i;sjUi), which
shows that di®erent consumer segments will have di®erent cost-of-living indexes not only because they
have di®erent preference ordering (that is, di®erent Ui's), but also because they pay di®erent prices for
the same bundle of observable characteristics as described in the model.
23generate predicted prices for a speci¯c vector of good and consumer characteristics using
the hedonic function described above. In this case, the econometrician needs to know
either the consumer-speci¯c attributes which di®erentiate consumers by consumer type,
or she needs to observe the characteristic of the good that the ¯rm uses to separate the
market.
If the econometrician knows the speci¯c characteristic the ¯rm uses to separate the
market, then this variable can be included in the hedonic regression to control for the








where vi;j is the characteristic of good j on which type i consumers place a speci¯c value.
If rank is highly correlated with the amount of time the good has been on the market,
as is the case in our model, then vintage would be a proxy for this unobserved variable
(that is, rank) in the hedonic regression. Since vi;j is speci¯c to the consumer group and
the good, it is analogous to including bi;r in the hedonic regression.
If, however, the econometrician has access to consumer data, she could proxy for
the premium with demographic variables such as income. That is, since ° is uniquely
identi¯ed in the model by either the consumer type or the unobserved component of
the good as in equation (11), one can control for its e®ects on prices by controlling for
either the consumer type, i, or a speci¯c attribute of the good that identi¯es rank (such
as vintage). If we were to instead include the demographic variables when creating an








where zi is a vector of demographic variables that takes into account consumer i's pref-
erence ordering. This speci¯cation allows for more than one predicted price for two
goods with the same bundle of characteristics. The resulting hedonic Laspeyres index





































tqi;j and represents the expenditure share of good j in consumer
i's basket, Ci
t. The index for the entire population can be represented as a population





















tqi;j;t represents the expenditure share of consumer group i. Unlike
the original hedonic index, equation (24), Ihr(Pt;Pt+1) takes into account the fact that
consumers in the same demographic group, i, may make similar purchases according to
some characteristic of the good that is unobservable to the econometrician.
For example, in the case of no constant in the hedonic regression the segment-hedonic
prices for period t and t+1 are hr
t(zi;xj) = ^ ®tzi+ ^ ¯txj and hr
t+1(zi;xj) = ^ ®t+1zi+ ^ ¯t+1xj,
respectively. As long as ^ ®, the ¯xed e®ect that controls for consumer demographics,





measures the change in the predicted measure of price per quality of good purchased by
consumer-type i, ^ ¯. Thus, the segment-hedonic price relative inherently controls for the
premium charged to consumers of a certain demographic group.
6 Index Estimation
6.1 TUP Index
We create hedonic cost-of-living indexes with the TUP data under the index speci¯-
cations described in the previous section and depict them in Table 3. The table shows
estimates of the Laspeyeres index under speci¯cation (24) using equation (15) as the
hedonic function. We call this the \standard hedonic" in the table. We also show es-
timates under speci¯cation (25), where we substitute income for zi;t in calculating the
hedonic function, h¤ as in equation (23). We call this latter speci¯cation \hedonic with
income."27
27Indexes that included all of the demographic variables included look very similar to those that just
include income.
25The standard hedonic regression we run is that of the logarithm of price on the loga-
rithm of speed, ram, hard drive capacity, as well as dummy variables representing brand,
form, and various peripherals included on the survey form.28 We also include dummies
which represent the state in which the computer was purchased. The base hedonic with
income regression includes all of the base variables plus dummy variables representing
17 income bins. We use a weighted regression using the computer weights provided to
us by Metafacts, which were also used to calculate the expenditure weights.29 Standard
errors of the indexes were calculated using a residual bootstrap in which residuals of the
hedonic regression were resampled with replacement.30
Table 3 and Figure 5 show the indexes over the ¯ve year sample period. Although
the standard errors are relatively large, the results show that the index including income
in the hedonic regression is larger in all but one year. This one year anomaly may be due
to the recession which caused high income consumers to become more sensitive to price.
The average weighted hedonic with income shows that prices fall, on average, 8.6 percent
annually (that is, 100 minus 90.4) while the average base hedonic shows that prices fall
9.6 percent annually (that is, 100 minus 91.4). Thus, prices fall on the magnitude of
one tenth faster (i.e. 1 divided by 9.6) when not controlling for income in the weighted
regression. To test that the di®erence between the two indexes are signi¯cant, we took
a bootstrap sample with replacement of 1000 price indexes created using the residual
bootstrap method for the standard hedonic, and then repeated this for the segment
28The peripherals included were all dummy variables indicating the whether or not the peripheral was
included. The variables are docking station, USB Hub, ¯rewire, PCMCIA card, tape drive, CD, DVD,
CDR/CDRW, and DVDR/DVDRW.
29MetaFacts projects survey computer sample results that are representative of the entire U.S. mar-
ket for a speci¯c household type. The ¯rst-stage weighting adjustment was made to compensate for
the varying response rates of the follow-up comprehensive surveys and for over-sampling of non-using
households. The second-stage weighting was made to project sample results to the entire population of
U.S. households. The third-stage weighting adjustment was made to bring the data more into line with
BLS estimates for total adult and total employed adult populations.
30The residual bootstrap works as follows: In the ¯rst stage, the hedonic regression for period t is run.
The residuals are collected and sampled with replacement to create simulated prices, ^ p¤ = h+¹¤, where
¹¤ is a given residual sampled from the distribution of residuals. 1000 bootstrap samples of simulated
prices were collected, in which 1000 price indexes could be created for each time period. The standard
deviation of the distribution of indexes is then reported.
26hedonic. Of those sampled using the segment hedonic, 768 (that is, 77 percent) resulted
in total price declines that were less steep than the standard hedonic.
6.2 NPD Index
We now look at hedonic indexes with the NPD scanner data. This dataset has an
advantage over the TUP data because there is less measurement error in both the sam-
pling distribution of the computers as well as the reported price and attributes of the
computer. The disadvantage is that we do not have demographic variables. However,
we do know the age of the computer (or its vintage), which is a characteristic of the
computer that is potentially correlated with the product's rank and subsequently con-
sumer characteristics. Thus, we can form hedonic indexes using the hedonic function in
equation (22) where we proxy vi;j with vintage.
Comparable to the TUP indexes, we calculate \standard hedonic" indexes as well
as \standard with vintage" hedonic regressions in which we include dummy variables
representing the computer's time on the market (in months). The base hedonic regression
is that of the logarithm of price on the logarithm of speed, ram, hard drive, display size,
and dummies indicating brand, form (that is, laptop, desktop, etc.), operating system,
and other peripherals included with the computer.
Table 4 presents estimates of a matched-model, baseline hedonic, and the baseline
hedonic with vintage dummies.31 We report the average of the monthly price index for
each type of price measure. The table shows that, similar to including income in the
hedonic regression, including vintage in the price measure shows that prices are falling
less rapidly. Speci¯cally, the average monthly price fall is 3.8 and 3.6 percent under the
matched-model and hedonic, respectively, while the monthly price fall is is approximately
zero on average under the hedonic vintage Laspeyres index. Figure 6 shows the NPD
price index under all three measures. While the standard-hedonic and matched-model
indexes overlap and both show rapidly declining prices, the hedonic which controls for
vintage shows the resulting price level is higher by the end of the sample period. As we
did with the TUP index, we test that the standard hedonic and the hedonic with vintage
31All indexes use Laspeyres weights. Results did not change when using Paasche weights. See the
appendix for more detailed results.
27are signi¯cantly di®erent. Of the 1000 sampled boot strap indexes using the hedonic
with vintage, 990 (that is, 99 percent) resulted in total price declines that were less steep
than the standard hedonic. The di®erent results using the TUP and NPD indexes are
likely attributed to measurement error in the survey as well as the fact that we are using
a di®erent proxy for consumer heterogeneity in each.
7 Conclusion
Price measures based on either a matched-model or hedonic methods show signi¯cant
cost-of-living declines for personal computers. Our model shows that these cost-of-living
declines will be overstated if ¯rms are setting prices in order to separate the market
between consumers with di®ering price elasticities or di®ering tastes for a product's
relative position on the quality ladder. This result is especially compelling because
our empirical work is consistent with such separation actually occurring in the market.
Speci¯cally, we ¯nd that higher income consumers pay a higher price than do lower
income consumers for computers of the same underlying quality. Furthermore, scanner
data from the NPD show that for a given computer model, nominal price falls over the life
of the good.These two empirical ¯ndings point to the fact that higher income consumers
purchase earlier in the life of the product when the markup is highest.
Our model shows that one should control for consumer heterogeneity when construct-
ing price indexes and predicts that a standard matched-model and hedonic price measures
will understate in°ation. Our empirical ¯ndings correspond with these theoretical pre-
dictions as we ¯nd that cost-of-living indexes which control for consumer income and the
age of the product show less dramatic falls in prices in comparison to measures based on
the standard matched-model and hedonic measures. Controlling for a consumer's income
in the TUP survey data, we ¯nd that prices fall approximately one tenth as much as
compared to the standard hedonic measure without income. Furthermore, when control-
ling for the age of the computer in the scanner data, we ¯nd that prices are rising over
the sample period as opposed to declining.
There is ample room for future analysis on this topic. While the segment indexes
constructed in this study are suitable for demonstrating the potential impact of con-
28sumer heterogeneity on a cost-of-living index, such household survey information is not
readily available to the BLS. Furthermore, including the age of the computer in the he-
donic regression may not necessarily be a suitable ¯x if manufacturers are introducing
new computers not at the frontier technology. Thus, developing a more intricate esti-
mation technique to better capture consumer segments in existing BLS data seems like
a worthwhile endeavor for future research.
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31A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We start with the condition:
pt(xr) ·
1 ¡ ¯(1 + ¾f)
1 ¡ ¯(1 + ¾p)
f(xr) (26)
· ±f(xr) (27)
We must ¯rst ¯nd conditions of the parameters ¯, ¾f, and ¾p in which pt(xr) ¸ 0. It
follows that:











which means that both growth rates have to either be above or below the threshold
1¡¯
¯ .
We now show that it is never optimal for the ¯rm to set the growth path of prices, ¾p,
di®erent from ¾f. We start under the condition that ¾f;¾p >
1¡¯
¯ which means that
1 ¡ ¯(1 + ¾p) is positive and increasing in ¾p. Given its current price, pt(xr), if the ¯rm
increases the growth rate such that ¾p > ¾f, then 1 ¡ ¯(1 + ¾p) will increase, which
subsequently causes the upper bound on the price level to rise. The ¯rm will therefore
deviate from this strategy by raising pt(xr) which lowers ¾p. If the ¯rm instead lowers
the growth rate such that ¾p < ¾f, then the upper bound of the price level will decrease
and the ¯rm will be forced to lower pt(xr) which will raise ¾p. Therefore, the only stable
path is ¾p = ¾f.
We next look at the problem when ¾f;¾p <
1¡¯
¯ , which means 1¡¯(1+¾p) is negative
and approaching zero as ¾p increases. In this case, if the ¯rm raises ¾p given pt(xr), such
that ¾p > ¾f, j1 ¡ ¯(1 + ¾p)j will fall as it approaches zero. The upper bound of the
price level will therefore fall, forcing the ¯rm to lower pt(xr) and subsequently raising ¾p
even further. The ¯rm will therefore lower prices until they hit zero. If the ¯rm lowers
¾p such that ¾p < ¾f, j1 ¡ ¯(1 + ¾p)j will increase as it approaches 1. Therefore, the
upper bound price level will rise, inducing the ¯rm to raise pt(xr) will lowers ¾p even
further. Again, the only stable path is ¾p = ¾f.









Note: Price change averages are based on total units sold for each model over the ¯rst six months on







qb , where ¢Pj;t is the monthly change in price of model j (that is,,
ln
Pj;t









































Note: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of price for both ¯xed-e®ect regressions (1)
and (2), where the ¯xed e®ect is an indicator of the year-RAM-speed-harddrive-form-manufacturer. As
the TUP survey does not indicate the size of the monitor purchased, we limit our sample to desktop
computers purchased with no monitor.
34Table 3: Technology User Pro¯le Hedonic Indexes
Standard Hedonic Hedonic with Income
1999 to 2000 0.898 0.921
(0.058) (0.067)
2000 to 2001 0.960 0.965
(0.039) (0.042)
2001 to 2002 0.890 0.881
(0.038) (0.039)




Note: The hedonic index is based on a regression of the logarithm of price on the logarithm of speed,
ram, hard drive capacity, as well as dummy variables representing brand, form, and various peripherals
included on the survey form. The hedonic with income includes income in the regression. Standard
errors were calculated using a residual bootstrap in which residuals of the hedonic regression were
resampled with replacement.
35Table 4: NPD Hedonic Indexes
Index (Averages)






Note: Averages of the monthly price changes for the sample period are reported. The hedonic index is
formed from a hedonic regression of the logarithm of price on the logarithm of speed, ram, hard drive,
display size, and dummies indicating brand, form (that is, laptop, desktop, etc.), operating system, and
other peripherals included with the computer. The hedonic-vintage includes age-of-computer (that is,
vintage) dummies. Standard errors were calculated using a residual bootstrap in which residuals of the
hedonic regression were resampled with replacement.















Note: Depicted are the price contours of all 15 inch notebook computers sold by Hewlett Packard. For
ease of view, prices after the the units CDF reached 90 percent for each model were omitted. Source:
NPD
37Figure 2: Generating Price Contours
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38Figure 4: Converting the Axis to Price versus Quality
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